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In this paper, we use data from developing countries to argue that sovereign defaults are often caused
by fiscal pressures generated by large-scale domestic defaults. We argue that these systemic domestic
defaults are caused by shocks best interpreted as being non-fundamental. We construct a model that
is consistent with these observations. The key ingredient of the model is that it is impossible to liquidate
large amounts of entrepreneurial assets. This restriction generates the possibility of a domestic coordinated
default crisis, in which domestic borrowers find it optimal to default because all other borrowers are















In developing countries, governments face occasional sharp increases in the interest
rates that they pay as borrowers. These sovereign debt crises often (but not always) precede
debt restructuring or actual default. In this paper, we provide a novel explanation of these
events.
We begin by providing new types of evidence about the sources of sovereign debt
crises. We use data on sovereign and domestic private sector interest rates to show that
ex-ante measures of domestic private sector default risk are positively correlated over time
with sovereign default risk. We also demonstrate that sovereign defaults are often associated
with large numbers of domestic defaults, such as bank insolvencies and non-performing bank
loans. Thus, sovereign defaults and sovereign debt crises are external problems that coincide
with similar problems in internal ﬁnancial markets.
This analysis does not identify the basic sources of these twin problems. We use two
types of evidence to address this issue. First, we look at the temporal connection between
internal debt crises, which are generated by large-scale private sector loan defaults, and
sovereign defaults. We show that in countries that experience both private and sovereign
default crises, the private internal debt crisis typically precedes the sovereign default. Thus,
problems in internal ﬁnancial markets precede external problems for sovereign borrowers. We
also show that internal debt crises put strong ﬁscal pressures on government, because they
involve large ﬁscal transfers to lenders such as bank depositors and owners.
To get more detailed causal evidence, we turn to the particular case study of Indonesia
in 1997. We document that a fall in the value of the Thai baht triggered domestic bank
loan defaults in Indonesia. There were few connections between the Thai and Indonesian
economies; hence, the basic shock seems to be non-fundamental in nature. Here, as is true
more generally, the bank loan defaults led to large ﬁscal transfers to banks and consequently
to sovereign default.
We reach the following conclusions from our examination of the evidence. Non-
fundamental shocks have the capability to generate large-scale domestic defaults. Such de-
faults cause the government’s net tax collections to fall. Domestic governments then face ﬁscal
pressures that can possibly lead to defaults. Given this chain of events, sharp increases ininterest rates on sovereign and domestic loans are attributable to increases in the probability
of the underlying non-fundamental shocks.
In the remainder of the paper, we build a model that rationalizes why these events
occur, and why developing countries are especially prone to them. Our model has the fol-
lowing elements. There is a benevolent government in a small open economy which borrows
from foreign risk-neutral lenders to buy public goods. At the same time, a small number of
domestic risk-averse entrepreneurs borrow from domestic risk-averse lenders to buy capital
goods for use in a productive investment opportunity. The domestic entrepreneurs’ invest-
ment returns are a binary random variable that may equal zero with positive probability;
returns are, ex-post, known only to the entrepreneur. The government imposes lump-sum
taxes on these domestic lenders in order to ﬁnance its repayments to the foreign lenders.
Liquidation p l a y sak e yr o l ei nt h em o d e l . T h ee n t r e p r e n e u r ’ sc a p i t a lg o o d sc a n
be liquidated to become consumption goods, but liquidation involves a social loss.1 We
focus on equilibrium loan contracts which specify repayment/liquidation as a function of the
entrepreneurs’ declarations of success or failure. In an equilibrium contract, a successful
entrepreneur will make a payment to the lender without any liquidation. In contrast, an
unsuccessful entrepreneur will liquidate some of his capital, and use that to make a payment
to the lender. Thus, equilibrium contracts look like standard debt contracts, with default
provisions.
We document that in Indonesia in 1997, liquidation of a given debt took much longer
because many debts were simultaneously in default. This observation motivates our key as-
sumption: there is an upper bound on the total amount of capital that can be liquidated.
Hence, if many entrepreneurs default, the lender can only liquidate a small amount of capital
from each of them. We show that if the upper bound on aggregate liquidation is suﬃ-
ciently tight, then a positive probability non-fundamental shock (a sunspot) can generate
what we term a coordinated default crisis. In this crisis, domestic entrepreneurs use the non-
fundamental shock to coordinate on a default decision, even if they have been successful. The
crisis is generated by a simple self-fulﬁlling belief: If all entrepreneurs know that all other
1This approach to designing an optimal loan repayment contract with default is similar to that taken by
Diamond (1984) and Rampini (2005).
2entrepreneurs are going to default, then they all know that they face a small sanction for
doing so.
The massive default means that the domestic lenders cannot pay their taxes. Without
these tax payments, the sovereign cannot repay the foreign lender in full. Indeed, in these
crises, it may well be optimal (for risk-sharing reasons) for the foreign lender to make transfers
to the sovereign. The government will then give those transfers to the domestic lenders.
Thus, our model is consistent with all of our earlier observations. Domestic default
crises and sovereign default crises are tightly linked in the model and in the data. In the
model, as in the data, non-fundamental shocks are responsible for the crises, which can
feature large transfers from governments (and foreign lenders) to domestic lenders. As well,
we prove that in our model, the returns to both domestic debt and sovereign debt rise when
non-fundamental shocks become more likely. In this sense, domestic debt and sovereign debt
returns are correlated in our model, just as we found that they are in the data.
In the data, sovereign defaults and internal debt crises are often associated with large
real exchange rate depreciations. Our model is consistent with this phenomenon. We think of
the entrepreneurs’ projects as producing nontradables. At the same time, the domestic lender
has an outside opportunity to invest in the production of tradables. A real exchange rate
depreciation makes the outside opportunity look more attractive. It follows that equilibrium
contracts have to feature larger liquidations from defaulting entrepreneurs to compensate the
lender. It is exactly these large liquidations that generate the possibility of default crises
according to our theory.
The existence of coordinated default crises in our model is an example of what is called
an implementation problem in the optimal contracting literature. In our model, an equilibrium
contract generates a reporting game between entrepreneurs by specifying repayments and
liquidations as a function of the joint reports of the entrepreneurs about their outcomes. In
one equilibrium of this game, both entrepreneurs tell the truth, and induce a constrained
Pareto optimal allocation of resources. The key property of our model is that, under some
parameter settings, the equilibrium contract allows for a second equilibrium in the reporting
game in which both lie. The resultant equilibrium outcome is not constrained Pareto optimal.
There is a large literature on implementation problems in contractual design. Our
3paper is most related to the recent contributions of Bassetto and Phelan (2006) and Bond
and Hagerty (2007). As in our paper, their implementation problems emerge because society’s
ability to provide a negative incentive to a given player depends on the number of players
who are also supposed to receive such incentives. More concretely, Bassetto and Phelan
hypothesize that the probability of any given taxpayer’s being audited falls if all taxpayers
claim to have low incomes. Under this hypothesis, there is an equilibrium in which all
taxpayers choose to default on their tax obligations, regardless of their true incomes. Bond
and Hagerty assume that resources for crime enforcement cannot be adjusted in response to
the level of crime. Again, this technological restriction generates a second inferior equilibrium
with large amounts of crime.
Why do we need a theory of sovereign debt crises? Some sovereign default episodes
can be rationalized using movements in output or other fundamentals. (See Arellano (2007)
for such an account of the recent sovereign default episode in Argentina.) Nonetheless, it is
widely recognized that the connection between sovereign defaults and economic fundamentals
is, at best, loose.2 Without a convincing fundamental explanation available, other economists
following Calvo (1988) have turned, as we have, to a non-fundamental one. In a series
of policy papers about sovereign debt crises, Sachs (1997), Krugman (1998), Chari and P.
Kehoe (1998), Fischer (1999), and Krueger (2002) attribute them to panics or more general
forms of coordination failures among foreign lenders. The rough idea is that, without any
change in fundamentals, all foreign lenders change their beliefs about other lenders’ behavior.
This change in beliefs generates a bank run of sorts on the sovereign borrower.3
We see two major problems with this external debt crisis explanation of sovereign debt
crises. The ﬁrst is a conceptual one. The external debt crisis explanation emphasizes the
behavior of foreign lenders. But sovereign debt crises do not aﬀect all borrowing countries -
just developing ones. The external debt crisis theory does not tell us why this diﬀerence in
the characteristics of the borrower should aﬀect the prevalence of crises. Our theory does:
2For example, Tomz and Wright (2006) document that 38 percent of default episodes since 1820 have
occurred when countries had GDP levels above trend.
3Cole and T. Kehoe (2000) go beyond purely verbal intuitions, and provide models of this phenomenon.
They emphasize that sovereign debtors might default when foreign lenders refuse to roll over debt because
they believe other lenders may also refuse to do so.
4developing countries cannot liquidate enough capital when large numbers of entrepreneurs
default.
The second problem is an empirical one. Above, we document that sovereign defaults
are systematically related to large-scale private domestic defaults within the borrowing coun-
try. More speciﬁcally, we show that default risk in loans made to a government is positively
associated with default risk in the loans made among domestic private lenders and that do-
mestic debt crises largely precede sovereign debt crises. Again, the external debt crisis theory
tells us nothing about this phenomenon. Our theory is deliberately designed to rationalize
it.
The distinction between our new theory and the existing one is not of purely academic
interest. The above-cited policy papers all agree that there is a need for the International
Monetary Fund to adopt policies that curtail these panics among external lenders. (They do
disagree on the exact policy that this agency should follow). When internal crises are the key
problem, the IMF and other international agencies really play no useful role. According to our
theory, developing countries have sovereign debt problems because their process of domestic
debt repayment is highly strained when faced with large numbers of domestic defaults. We
model this limitation as purely technological. More realistically, developing countries can
achieve better outcomes by improving their ﬁnancial institutions to deal with potential large-
scale defaults.
2. Evidence
In this section, we provide evidence that sovereign debt crises are triggered by increases
in the probability of private sector defaults. We ﬁrst document that sovereign default risk
and private default risk move together in developing countries in both an ex-ante and ex-post
sense. From an ex-ante perspective, we show that the dollar spreads on international sovereign
bonds have a tight correlation to dollar domestic lending spreads charged to private borrowers.
From an ex-post perspective, we show that episodes of international sovereign defaults largely
coincide with episodes of large domestic private defaults.
Second, we ﬁnd that these twin debt crises begin with problems in the private sector
that pass into the sovereign government. We document that internal debt crises typically
5pre-date sovereign defaults and that these episodes are characterized by large transfers from
the government to the private sector. Finally, we discuss the case of Indonesia in 1997. There,
non-fundamental pressures generated a breakdown in the domestic banking system and vast
private defaults. The internal debt crisis then led the government to default on its sovereign
debt, due to ﬁscal pressures coming from its bailing out banks.
A. Sovereign Default and Private Default
We ﬁrst look at the co-movement of the probability of default for sovereign govern-
ments and private borrowers in emerging markets. Our data set consists of monthly data for
eighteen emerging markets: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Thailand, Ukraine,
and Venezuela. Our choice of countries is guided by data availability — the countries we con-
sider belong to the set included in J. P. Morgan’s EMBI+, to the emerging markets considered
in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998), or both. Our measure for sovereign default probabilities4
is the EMBI+ spread for each country, which is the diﬀerence between the yield of dollar
denominated bonds relative to the yield of similar U.S. government bonds.5
Table 1: Correlations of Sovereign and Private Default Risk
Argentina 0.81 Nigeria 0.47
Brazil 0.38 Panama 0.44
Chile 0.45 Peru 0.69
Colombia 0.08 Philippines -0.40
Ecuador 0.37 Poland -0.48
Indonesia 0.29 Russia 0.47
Korea 0.54 Thailand 0.54
Malaysia 0.18 Ukraine 0.41
Mexico 0.85 Venezuela 0.33
4Treating the EMBI+ spread in this way ignores other possible sources of changes in expected returns.
These include variations in liquidity or variations in country-speciﬁc betas relative to the world market
portfolio.
5Five of these countries (Chile, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand) do not have EMBI+ spreads.
For these countries, we use spreads of an alternative government bond, instead of the EMBI+ spread. The
details are in Appendix A.
6For the private sector, we need a measure that captures the probability of default of
domestic private borrowers on their loans. To this end, we use the dollar lending rates of
domestic banks relative to the yield of United States Treasury bills. In countries for which
domestic dollar rates are not available, we use the local currency spread between the average
lending rate and the average deposit rate to proxy default probabilities. Table 1 shows that the
correlations of sovereign and private default risk are strongly positive for 15 of the countries
in the sample.6 Figure 1 further illustrates the strong co-movement between sovereign default
risk and private default risk and that spikes in sovereign default probabilities are generally
accompanied by spikes in the domestic private default probabilities.7
Thus, from an ex-ante perspective, sovereign and private loan default probabilities
ﬂuctuate together over time. We now present evidence of ex-post covariation. We show that
since 1980, episodes of sovereign defaults largely coincide with periods of internal debt crises.
To date sovereign defaults, we use the Standard and Poor’s classiﬁcation and include defaults
on both foreign currency bank debt and foreign currency bond debt. To proxy internal debt
crises, we use the commonly used dates of banking crises from Caprio and Klingebiel (2003).
As they document, these crises are characterized by widespread domestic defaults with large
increases in non-performing loans and collapses of banks.8
Table 2 shows that from 1980-2003 there have been 22 sovereign defaults in our sample
of emerging markets and 19 of those have also involved an internal debt crisis.9 These coun-
tries have also experienced 14 additional internal debt crises without a sovereign default. The
unconditional default probability in any year is equal to 6.9% and the unconditional internal
debt crisis probability is equal to 8.8% in our sample. Sovereign defaults also occur together
6The correlations between EMBI+ spreads and nominal lending rates are strongly positive for all countries
in the sample including Colombia, Phillipines and Poland. This ﬁnding is similar to that of Mendoza and
Yue (2007). They show that the correlation between EMBI+ spreads and ﬁrm ﬁnancing costs are strongly
positive. Their measure of the latter is in terms of domestic currency, and so includes an own-country
inﬂationary component.
7Appendix A contains the description and sources of all the data.
8Only two of the banking crises described by Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) in their paper feature bank
runs. Neither of these is included in our subsample of countries and crises.
9Importantly, the concurrence of internal debt crises and sovereign defaults appears greater than for the
more studied twin crises of balance of payments and internal debt. Kaminsky and Reinhart report that
from 1975 to 1995 in a sample of 20 countries, from the 57 balance of payment crises, only 19 of them were













































































































































































































Figure 1: Sovereign and Private Sector Default Risks Over Time
8with internal debt crises in a broader sample of all 93 middle income countries. We ﬁnd that
39 out of the 63 sovereign defaults that occurred in these countries have been accompanied
by internal debt crises. Appendix A contains the countries and dates for sovereign defaults
and internal debt crises in our sample of emerging markets.
Table 2: Sovereign Defaults and Internal Debt Crises from 1980-2003
Only Sovereign Only Private Both
Emerging markets 3 14 19
Middle income countries 24 43 39
B. Causal Channel
We have documented a positive association between domestic default risk and sovereign
default risk and that two events - domestic private defaults and sovereign defaults - tend
to occur together. However, this evidence does not speak to the issue of causation. In
this subsection, we show that cross country evidence points towards domestic private sector
defaults causing sovereign defaults.
We ﬁnd that the typical case evolves as follows. First, an internal debt crisis occurs
in the country, characterized by large levels of non-performing loans and many failing local
banks. The government then transfers resources to the banking sector. Subsequently, the
government defaults on its sovereign international debt. This timing of events in the cross
section of countries suggests that the origin of the twin debt crises are the private domestic
defaults.
One way to see the imprint of this basic story is that in our sample of emerging
markets, internal debt crises largely predate sovereign defaults. >From the 19 joint crises,
the internal debt crisis started at least a year before the sovereign default in 11 cases, started
after the sovereign default in 4 cases and occurred contemporaneously during the same year
in 4 cases. Internal debt crises are very costly for the government, reaching in some cases over
950% of GDP. The average ﬁscal cost from the internal debt crises in the sample of emerging
markets is 19.7% of GDP.
To get more detail, we turn to a speciﬁc case study: Indonesia in 1997. The Indonesian
crisis illustrates how domestic private defaults can generate sovereign defaults. We further
ﬁnd that the deep internal debt crisis in Indonesia was generated largely by non-fundamental
forces.
In June 1997, the banking sector in Indonesia was largely solvent, with a surplus of
assets compared to liabilities of 8%.10 On July 2, 1997, the Thai government allowed the baht
to ﬂoat, and it depreciated dramatically. Thailand has few economic links with Indonesia.11
Despite this lack of links, an enormous internal debt crisis began to unravel in Indonesia
soon after the baht’s depreciation. By October of 1997, 50 banks were considered insolvent,
and by March of 1998, that number increased to 154 banks. These banks had large levels of
non-performing loans, exceeding in some cases 90% of the loans, and accounted for half of
the banking system. By March 1999 the banking system had a deﬁcit of assets compared to
liabilities of -34%.12
The large private sector defaults and bank failures generated a large pressure for the
government to transfers funds to banks. By January of 1998, the government had provided
liquidity to banks that amounted to 7% of Indonesia’s 1997 GDP. And in August of 1998,
the government defaulted on its international bank debt, in large part because of the ﬁscal
burden associated with bailing out the banks.
C. Summary
We have shown that private sector default probabilities co-vary with sovereign default
probabilities. We have also presented evidence that the causation runs from the private
10See Enoch, Baldwin, Frecaut, and Kovanen (2001) for further discussion on Indonesian internal debt
crisis.
11For example, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) ﬁnd that trade linkages are too weak for them to explain
the contagion in Asia. Thailand exports to Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Philippines combined are only
8% of Thailand’s exports.
12Despite the prominent role of foreign currency debt in theoretical models of ﬁnancial crises, most of the
empirical ﬁrm level evidence has not found a signiﬁcant eﬀect of currency mismatch. Beakley and Cowan
(2008) ﬁnd that ﬁrms holding dollar debt do not invest less than ﬁrms holding peso debt following large
devaluation episodes in Latin America. Luengnaruemitchai (2003) ﬁnds a similar result for Asian ﬁrms
during the Asian Crisis.
10sector to the sovereign, as widespread private sector defaults generate ﬁscal transfers from
the sovereign, which lead to sovereign default. At least in Indonesia in 1997, the source of
the private sector defaults is manifestly non-fundamental. In what follows, we construct a
model that rationalizes this chain of events.
3. The Model: Environment and Equilibrium
In this section, we describe a simple model of domestic and foreign lending. We then
characterize equilibrium contracts in this setting.
A. Environment
We consider a small open economy. Within this country, there is a domestic lender,
who is endowed with two units of investment goods in period 1. The domestic lender has a
technology that converts these goods into 2R units of consumption goods in period 2, where
R>1; this technology will serve as the lender’s outside option. We think of this domestic
lender as being any agent within the country who contributes resources to investment. In
this sense, bank depositors are domestic lenders.
There are also two entrepreneurs. Entrepreneur n has a technology that converts 1 unit
of investment goods in period 1 into Rn units of consumption goods in period 2. Here, Rn,
n =1 ,2, are i.i.d. random variables, with realizations that are determined at the beginning
of period 2. With probability (1 − p), Rn equals RH >R>0 and with probability p,i t s
realization is R0 =0 . There is a key informational restriction in this setting: the realization
of Rn is privately known to entrepreneur n, and the entrepreneur has the ability to consume
the project return secretly.
Entrepreneurs also have a technology that liquidates invested capital in period 2. If
L units of capital are liquidated, then it generates δL units of consumption goods, 0 ≤ δ ≤
1. Entrepreneurs, but not lenders, derive consumption beneﬁts from the (1 − L) units of
unliquidated capital. Those consumption beneﬁts equal BE(1 − L) units of consumption,
where BE > 1. Hence, there is a social loss associated with liquidation and repayment of
loans using capital. We assume throughout that 0 ≤ L ≤ 1, so that liquidation is bounded
by the entrepreneur’s total capital investment.13
13We refer to the entrepreneurs’ liquidating their capital. We can just as easily interpret the "capital" in
11An entrepreneur has a utility function uE over total consumption, which includes the
consumption beneﬁts from unliquidated capital. The domestic lender has a utility func-





E > 0,a n duL(0) = uE(0) = 0. Both functions exhibit non-increasing ab-
solute risk aversion. The consumptions of the lender and entrepreneurs of every good are
restricted to be non-negative.
In addition to the three agents, there is a government. The government is able to
borrow and lend from foreign lenders at a gross rate of return RFOR > 1. The government
needs to create G amount of public goods in period 1. It does so by borrowing G units of
consumption goods in period 1 from an international debt market, and then transforming
them, one for one, into the required public goods. It repays this loan in period 2, using taxes
τ collected from the domestic lender.
The key to the model is that we impose a non-trivial upper bound on aggregate
liquidation. We are motivated to adopt this assumption by observations from Indonesia
in 1997-99. Indonesia had two separate systems designed to handle liquidations of failing
ﬁrms. Initially, it had only a court system. But the courts quickly became overloaded
with bankruptcy cases to resolve. As a response, the Jakarta Initiative Task Force (JITF)
was created as a way to allow for less formal workouts. However, both the court system
and the JITF had very limited success in expediting the process of non-performing loans.
By October 1999, only 42 bankruptcy cases were settled through the Courts, out of the
112 ﬁled cases. Only 27 cases were settled through JITF, out of the 350 ﬁles cases. The
general sentiment was that "the organizational capacity and human resources of the court
appeared insuﬃcient to meet the extraordinary demand for debt settlement posed by massive
bankruptcies" (Insolvency Systems in Asia: An Eﬃciency Perspective, OECD Report, 2001,
p. 57).
Given these observations, we assume that total liquidation is bounded from above by
ξ, where 1 ≤ ξ<2. This constraint says that if both entrepreneurs default, it is not possible
to take more than ξ/2 from either of them. As we shall see, this upper bound on liquidation
lies at the heart of the model.
the model as being "collateral goods", as in Kocherlakota (2001) and Kocherlakota and Shim (2007).
12Note that the model is designed to be as simple as is possible, given the facts that we
want to confront. We need a government and a foreign lender, because we want to include
international sovereign borrowing in the model. We need a domestic lender, because we want
to include private domestic borrowing/lending in the model. Finally, we need more than one
entrepreneur in the model in order to get the possibility of a coordination problem of some
kind.
B. Equilibrium
In period 2, the two entrepreneurs simultaneously announce their returns. There are
four possible outcomes for these announcements. At the beginning of period 1, the government
chooses a tax schedule (τs)s∈{0,1,2}, where τs is the domestic lender’s tax payment when s
entrepreneurs claim to have high returns. The government’s goal is to maximize a weighted
sum of the expected utilities of the entrepreneurs and the domestic lender.
After the government commits to a tax schedule, the domestic lender commits to a loan
contract (F,L) at the beginning of period 1. Under this contract, if in period 2 entrepreneur
1’s announced return is Ri and entrepreneur 2’s announced return is Rj, then entrepreneur
1’s repayment is Fij and entrepreneur 1’s liquidation is Lij. Symmetrically, entrepreneur 2’s
repayment is Fji and entrepreneur 2’s liquidation is Lji. The upper bounds on liquidation
and lower bounds on consumption of each good imply that for all (i,j) in {H,0}2:
Fij ≤ R
i
1 ≥ Lij ≥ 0 (1)
Lij + Lji ≤ ξ
The Revelation Principle says that, without loss of generality in terms of equilibrium out-
comes, we can focus on loan contracts that satisfy the incentive-compatibility condition:
(1 − p)[uE(BE (1 − LHH)+R
H − FHH)] + p[uE(BE (1 − LH0)+R
H − FH0)] (2)
≥ (1 − p)[uE(BE (1 − L0H)+R
H − F0H)] + p[uE(BE (1 − L00)+R
H − F00)]
Intuitively, entrepreneurs send simultaneous announcements of their returns to the lenders.
13These incentive-compatibility conditions guarantee that truth-telling is a Bayesian-Nash equi-
librium of this reporting game. We ignore the incentive-compatibility conditions for entre-
preneurs with zero returns; they turn out to be irrelevant in equilibrium.
While the model has only one active domestic lender, we suppose that there is potential
competition that forces the domestic lender to deliver all surplus to the entrepreneurs. This
potential competition implies that, regardless of the government’s choice of tax schedule,
the domestic lender gets only the reservation utility uL(2R). (More speciﬁcally, if the lender
gets more than that, a potential competitor will oﬀer a loan contract with a lower FHH.)
Hence, an equilibrium contract (τ,F,L) maximizes the utility of the entrepreneurs, and is




2[uE(BE (1 − LHH)+R
H − FHH)] + p(1 − p)[uE(BE (1 − LH0)+R
H − FH0)]
+p(1 − p)[uE(BE (1 − L0H) − F0H)] + p
2[uE(BE (1 − L00) − F00)]
subject to (1), (2), an individual rationality constraint for the domestic lender:
(1 − p)
2uL(2(FHH + δLHH) − τ2)+2 p(1 − p)uL(F0H + FH0 + δ(L0H + LH0) − τ1) (3)
+p
2uL(2(F00 + δL00) − τ0)=uL(2R)
and a zero-proﬁt constraint for the foreign lenders:
(4) (1 − p)
2τ2 +2 p(1 − p)τ1 + p
2τ0 ≥ R
FORG
The last constraint says that the government’s expected repayments are enough to compensate
the foreign lenders for the initial loan of size G.
The following proposition provides a partial characterization of equilibrium contracts.
It shows that they look like debt contracts, with partial liquidations by the risk-averse entre-
preneurs when they default.
Proposition 1. Suppose (τ,F,L) is an equilibrium contract. Then:
141.F HH = FH0 > 0
2. If RH >F HH, then LHH = LH0 =0
3. (τ,F,L) satisﬁes the incentive constraint (2) with equality
4. The zero proﬁtc o n s t r a i n t( 4 )i ss a t i s ﬁed with equality
5.F 00 = F0H =0
6. 2R =2 ( FHH + δLHH) − τ2 = F0H + FH0 +( δL0H + δLH0) − τ1
=2 ( F00 + δL00) − τ0
Proof. Statement 1: Suppose FHH 6= FH0. Deﬁne a new b F which is the same as F except
b FHH = b FH0 =( 1− p)FHH + pFH0. Then, the entrepreneurs get higher utility with (τ, b F,L),
because of the strict concavity of the objective. As well, (τ, b F,L) satisﬁes (1)-(4). Hence, in
any equilibrium contract, FHH = FH0.
Statement 2: If LHH or LH0 are positive, we can increase the objective, without
violating the constraints, by lowering them by ε while increasing FHH and FH0 by ε.
Statement 3: Suppose the third statement is false. Given that the incentive-
compatibility constraint does not bind, the ﬁrst order conditions for the equilibrium problem
imply that:
BE (1 − LHH)+R
H − FHH = BE (1 − LH0)+R
H − FH0
= BE (1 − L0H) − F0H = BE (1 − L00) − F00
But this violates the incentive constraint:
uE(BE (1 − LHH)+R
H−FHH) < (1−p)uE(BE (1 − L0H)+R
H−F0H)+puE(BE (1 − L00)+R
H−F00)
Statement 4: If the fourth statement is false, we can lower τ2 by ε and lower FHH
by ε/2 without violating any of the constraints and increasing the objective; hence, in any
equilibrium the zero proﬁt constraint holds with equality.
Statement 5: By (1), F00 and F0H are non-positive. To satisfy (2), we need that
F0j + L0j > 0 for at least one j. Suppose that F0H < 0 and L0H > 0. Deﬁne (b τ, b F,b L) to be a
15contract that is the same as (τ,F,L) except:
b F0H =0
b L0H = L0H + F0H/BE
b τ1 = b F0H − F0H + δb L0H − δL0H + τ1
T h ev a l u eo ft h eo b j e c t i v eu n d e r(b τ, b F,b L) is the same, and constraints (1), (2) and (3)
are satisﬁed. The zero proﬁtc o n d i t i o n(4) is slack now:
(1 − p)
2τ2 +2 p(1 − p)
³





FORG − F0H2p(1 − p)(1 − δ/BE) >R
FORG
>From the proof of Statement 4 above, we know that we can now lower τ2 by ε and
lower FHH by ε/2 to improve the entrepreneurs’ objective. Hence, if F0H < 0, (τ,F,L) cannot
be an equilibrium, because (b τ, b F,b L) improves upon it. A similar argument can be used to
show that F00 < 0 cannot be an equilibrium.
Statement 6: Suppose this statement is false. Then, we can deﬁne:
τ
0
2 =2 ( FHH + δLHH) − 2R
τ
0
1 = FH0 + F0H +( δL0H + δLH0) − 2R
τ
0
0 =2 ( F00 + δL00) − 2R
The value of the objective has remained the same, and constraints (1), (2) and (3) are
satisﬁed. Because uL is strictly concave, we know that the expected value of the domestic
lender’s consumption is lower under τ0:
(1 − p)
2(2(FHH + δLHH) − τ
0




2(2(F00 + δL00) − τ
0
0)
< (1 − p)
2(2(FHH + δLHH) − τ2)+2 p(1 − p)(FH0 + F0H + δL0H + δLH0 − τ1)
+p











> (1 − p)
2τ2 +2 p(1 − p)τ1 + p
2τ0
>From the proof of Statement 4 above, we know that we can now lower τ0
2 by ε and lower
FHH by ε/2 to improve the entrepreneurs’ objective. QED
The contracts described in Proposition 1 are essentially defaultable debt contracts. An
entrepreneur who announces a high return RH makes a positive repayment to the domestic
lender, and his capital is not liquidated. An entrepreneur who announces a low return makes
no payment to the domestic lender, and his capital is deﬁnitely partially liquidated. Thus,
announcing a low return is akin to deciding to default. Note that one entrepreneur’s contract
depends on the other’s default decision only through the level of liquidation. Note too that,
conditional on the entrepreneurs’ announced returns, there is no way to restructure payments
to make all participants better oﬀ. In this sense, the equilibrium contracts are renegotiation-
proof.
4. The Possibility of Crises
Suppose (τ,F,L) is an equilibrium contract. Given this contract, the two entrepreneurs
play a reporting game with one another in which they decide to report 0 or RH. Given the
nature of the equilibrium loan contract, we can interpret these choices as being to "default"
or "not to default" respectively. We noted above that the incentive-compatibility conditions
guarantee that if a successful entrepreneur chooses not to default, then it is optimal for the
other entrepreneur to make the same choice if successful. However, the incentive-compatibility
conditions do not rule out the possibility of other (strict) equilibria in this reporting game
between the entrepreneurs. Consider a putative equilibrium in which both entrepreneurs
decide to default when in fact they have high returns. This strategy forms a strict equilibrium
if:
uE(BE (1 − L00)+R
H) >u E(BE + R
H − FH0)
17(This condition exploits the result in Proposition 1 that LH0 =0and F00 =0in an equilibrium
contract.) In words, this condition says that an entrepreneur, with a high return, ﬁnds it
strictly optimal to default because he knows that the other entrepreneur is defaulting.14 We
shall call such an equilibrium a coordinated default crisis, and refer to contracts that allow
for such an equilibrium in the reporting game as being crisis contracts.
As the above description suggests, the constraint that caps aggregate liquidations plays
a fundamental role in generating crises. In particular, because F00 = F0H =0 ,L HH = LH0 =
0, and FH0 = FHH, we know that in any equilibrium:
uE(BE + R
H − FH0)
=( 1 − p)[uE(BE (1 − L0H)+R
H)] + p[uE(BE (1 − L00)+R
H)]
If L0H ≤ L00, then the equilibrium contract is not a crisis contract, because:
uE(BE + R
H − FH0) ≥ uE(BE (1 − L00)+R
H)
It follows that crisis contracts arise only because L0H may be higher than L00.
We provide a sharp characterization of the conditions under which equilibrium con-
tracts are in fact crisis contracts. The key to this characterization is to understand when the
constraint L00 ≤ ξ/2 binds. The following proposition is useful in this regard.
Proposition 2. Suppose (τ,F,L) is an equilibrium contract such that L00 <ξ / 2. Then:
L00 = L0H = L0 = FH/BE
Proof. Suppose (τ,F,L) is an equilibrium, but L0H 6= L00. Deﬁne the certainty equivalent










=( 1− p)uE(BE (1 − L0H)+R
H)+puE(BE (1 − L00)+R
H)
14We assume that if entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent between lying and telling the truth, they choose to tell
the truth. This (conventional) assumption implies that any crisis must necessarily be a strict equilibrium.
18Deﬁne (b τ, b F,b L) to be a contract that is the same as (τ,F,L) except:
b L00 = b L0H = b L0
b τ1 = δb L0H − δL0H + τ1
b τ0 =2
³
δb L00 − δL00
´
+ τ0





1 − b L0
´´
> (1 − p)uE(BE (1 − L0H)) + puE(BE (1 − L00))
and so the objective increases. Clearly, (b τ, b F,L) satisﬁes (1), (2), and (3). We also know that:
(1 − p)
2τ2 +2 p(1 − p)b τ1 + p
2b τ0
=( 1 − p)
2τ2 +2 p(1 − p)[δb L0H − δL0H + τ1]
+p
2[2δb L00 − 2δL00 + τ0]
= R
FORG +2 pδ[b L0 − (1 − p)L0H − pL00] >R
FORG
where the last inequality is implied by the strict concavity of uE. Hence, if L0H 6= L00, (τ,F,L)
cannot be an equilibrium, because (b τ, b F,b L) improves upon it. The incentive constraint is








, and so b L0 = FH/BE. QED
The aggregate resources the lender gets from entrepreneurs are lower when either of
them defaults, because liquidation is a costly form of repayment. The taxes collected by the
government perfectly insure the domestic lender against this risk, which is then absorbed by
the foreign lender. Hence, the payments received by the foreign lender from the sovereign
borrower can be ordered as follows:
τ2 >τ 1 >τ 0
We treat τ2 as the face value of the sovereign debt. We say that a partial sovereign default
occurs if the foreign lender receives τ1 and a full sovereign default occurs if the foreign lender
receives τ0.
19We can use the above proposition to readily solve for the equilibrium contract, when
the upper bound on liquidation is non-binding. In that case, FH/BE = L0H = L00 = L∗
0.
Hence, τ2 =2 L∗
0BE − 2R, τ1 = δL∗
0 − BEL∗
0 − 2R, and τ0 =2 δL∗
0 − 2R. We can substitute









0 = R + R
FORG/2






(1 − p)BE + pδ
This expression is useful in proving the following proposition that characterizes when
equilibrium contracts are in fact crisis contracts.
Proposition 3. If L∗
0(R,p,G,RFOR,B E) ≤ ξ/2, then no equilibrium contracts are crisis
contracts. If L∗





FOR,B E,δ) ≤ ξ/2
Consider a relaxed version of the equilibrium contracting problem, without the upper bounds
on L0H and L00. As argued before the proposition, in any solution to this relaxed problem,
L0H = L00 = L∗
0. Since L∗
0 ≤ ξ/2, any solution to the relaxed problem is also a solution to
the original equilibrium contracting problem. Hence, in any equilibrium contract, FHH =
FH0 = BEL∗
0, and L0H = L00 = L∗
0. Given that L0H = L00, none of these contracts is a crisis
contract.
Now suppose that ξ is small enough such that L∗
0(R,p,G,RFOR,B E) >ξ / 2. In any
equilibrium contract (τ,F,L),F HH = FH0 = FH, and (FH,L 0H,L 00) satisfy:




(1 − p)FH + p(1 − p)δL0H + p
2δL00 = R + R
FORG/2
20(The ﬁrst equality is the incentive constraint. The second equality is a combination of the
individual rationality and zero proﬁt constraints.) We claim that this contract is a crisis
contract; that is, we claim L0H >L 00. Suppose not. Then, ξ/2 ≥ L00 ≥ L0H. The incentive
constraint then implies that FH ≤ BEξ/2. Then, we can substitute into the zero proﬁt
constraint to get:
(1 − p)BEξ/2+p(1 − p)δξ/2+p
2δξ/2 ≥ R + R
FORG/2
B u tt h i si m p l i e st h a t :
ξ/2 ≥
R + RFORG/2
(1 − p)BE + δp
which violates the hypothesized upper bound on ξ/2. It follows that all equilibrium contracts
are crisis contracts. QED
The idea behind the proposition is simple. If ξ is high enough, then the upper bound on
aggregate liquidation is basically irrelevant. It is possible to spread the equilibrium liquidation
across the two states in such a way that L00 is equal to L0H, which eliminates the possibility
of a coordinated default crisis. On the other hand, if ξ is low enough that the constraint on
aggregate liquidation binds, L00 must be less than L0H in equilibrium.
It is simple to show that to satisfy the domestic lender’s individual rationality con-
straint, it is necessary that L∗
0(R,p,G,RFOR,B E,δ) > 1. Hence, Proposition 3 implies that
no equilibrium contract is a crisis contract if ξ =2 . Crises occur only because there is a
substantial constraint on aggregate liquidation.
In our model, liquidation provides a way to compensate the lenders and it provides a
way to discipline defaulting borrowers. Both roles matter in generating coordinated default
crises. If ξ is too low, then it is not possible to deliver a suﬃciently strong punishment if
both borrowers default simultaneously. If δ is too low, then more liquidation is required to
satisfy the zero-proﬁt-constraint of the lender. If the required amount of liquidation grows
to exceed ξ/2, then there is a possibility of coordinated default crises.
215. Crises and Correlations
Above we showed that for some parameter settings, under an equilibrium contract,
there is the possibility of a second equilibrium being played in the reporting game between
the entrepreneurs. However if this possibility is a real one, then the players, as Bayesians,
should assign a positive ex-ante probability to this equilibrium being played. Doing so will
aﬀect the design of the original contract itself.
More speciﬁcally, suppose with probability ε, the entrepreneurs both privately observe
1 at the beginning of period 2, and with probability (1−ε), they both observe 0. These private
signals allow the entrepreneurs to coordinate their reports. In particular, assume that it is
common knowledge that the entrepreneurs will default if they both observe 1 and if doing so
is a mutual best response, given a contract.15 We will call ε the sunspot probability.
As is typical in the coordination failure literature, we are silent about what the coordi-
nation device is. We think of the entrepreneurs as observing a number of independent payoﬀ
irrelevant signals. (For example, the entrepreneurs observe exchange rates from a host of
countries other than their own.) They choose which of these signals to use as a coordination
device.
In this section, we examine the structure of equilibrium contracts, given that coordi-
nated default crises are positive probability events. We show that equilibrium rates of return
on domestic and sovereign foreign debt are positively correlated.
A. Positively Correlated Debt Returns
The common private signal mentioned above does not aﬀect the nature of the feasibility
constraints (1) or incentive constraints (2). However, it does change the individual rationality
constraint (3), the zero proﬁt constraint (4), and the objective of the entrepreneurs. The
15The lender could ask the entrepreneurs whether they have seen the sunspot or not. However, it is not
possible to design a contract which does not have an equilibrium in which they jointly claim not to have seen
the sunspot, but they actually have. For this reason, we do not bother to extend the contract to depend on
the sunspot.
22individual rationality constraint becomes:
uL(2R)=( 1− ε)(1 − p)
2uL(2(FHH + δLHH) − τ2)
+2(1 − ε)p(1 − p)uL(F0H + FH0 + δL0H + δLH0 − τ1)
+[(1 − ε)p
2 + ε]uL(2(F00 + δL00) − τ0)
The zero proﬁt constraint becomes:
(1 − ε)(1 − p)
2τ2 +2 ( 1− ε)p(1 − p)τ1 +( p
2(1 − ε)+ε)τ0 ≥ R
FORG
Finally, the entrepreneur’s objective becomes:
(1 − ε)(1 − p)
2uE(BE (1 − LHH)+R
H − FHH)
+(1 − ε)p(1 − p)uE(BE (1 − LH0)+R
H − FH0)
+(1 − ε)p(1 − p)uE(BE (1 − L0H) − F0H)+[ ( 1− ε)p
2 + ε]uE(BE (1 − L00) − F00)
An equilibrium contract, given sunspot probability ε, must maximize (the altered version of)
the entrepreneur’s objective subject to (1), (2) and the altered versions of (3) and (4).
Let (τ(ε),F(ε),L(ε)) be an equilibrium contract given sunspot probability ε. It is
straightforward to use the same logic as in Proposition 1 to establish the following character-
ization of (τ(ε),F(ε),L(ε)), for any ε ≥ 0.
Proposition 4. Suppose (τ(ε),F(ε),L(ε)) is an equilibrium contract given sunspot proba-
bility ε.T h e n :
231.F HH(ε)=FH0(ε) > 0
2. If R
H >F HH(ε), then LHH(ε)=LH0(ε)=0
3. (τ(ε),F(ε),L(ε)) satisﬁes the incentive constraint (2) with equality
4.τ (ε) satisﬁes the zero proﬁtc o n s t r a i n t(4
0) with equality
5.F 0H(ε)=F00(ε)=0
6. 2R =2 ( FHH(ε)+δLHH(ε)) − τ2(ε)=F0H (ε)+FH0 (ε)+( δL0H (ε)+δLH0 (ε)) − τ1(ε)
=2 ( F00 (ε)+δL00(ε)) − τ0(ε)
Proof. The same as the proof of Proposition 1. QED






In the following proposition, we use this condition to prove that when sunspots are more
likely to occur, both domestic debt and sovereign foreign debt returns — that is, both FHH(ε)
and τ2(ε) —a r eh i g h e r .
Proposition 5. Deﬁne L∗
0 as in (5) to be the equilibrium liquidation in a contract in which





Then, for non-negative ε in a neighborhood of 0,F HH(ε) and τ2(ε) are both strictly increasing
in ε.
Proof. In Appendix B.
This proposition shows that if ε increases, a non-defaulting entrepreneur will make a
bigger debt repayment to the domestic lender and the government will make a bigger debt
24repayment to the foreign lender. Intuitively, when ε rises, the foreign lender is less likely to
receive the high repayment τ2. The foreign lender must be compensated for this probability
reduction with increased repayments by the government. This in turn calls for a larger
repayment of the non-defaulting entrepreneurs to the domestic lender.
The above assumes that the lender simply allows for the possibility of coordinated
default crises in oﬀering a contract. The lender could instead restrict contracts to ones that
eliminate coordinated default crises entirely. To do so, we augment the original contractual
choice problem to include the constraint:
u(BE + R
H − FH0) ≥ u(BE (1 − L00)+R
H)
or, equivalently, FH0 ≤ L00. Under the hypothesis of Proposition 3 about ξ,t h i sc o n s t r a i n t
must be binding. In the resultant contracts, FH0 <F HH. This extra randomness reduces
the value of the entrepreneur’s objective. However, the reduction is by an amount that is
independent of ε. It follows that, as long as ε is suﬃciently small, this kind of random contract
is suboptimal relative to the one described in Proposition 5.
To sum up: low-probability sunspots aﬀect the design of equilibrium contracts. In
particular, as the probability of a sunspot rises, the returns on domestic and foreign debt
both rise.
B. Real Exchange Rate Depreciations and Crises
In the data, sovereign debt crises are often associated with periods of real exchange
rate depreciation. Our model captures this connection in the following sense. In our model,
the domestic lender can lend to an entrepreneur or invest in an outside option. Suppose that
the utility of the lender is over wealth, and that the lender wants to maximize its wealth
to subsequently buy a bundle of tradable and nontradable goods. Furthermore, suppose
entrepreneurs are engaged in the production of nontradable goods, where incentive problems
are severe, while the lender’s outside opportunity consists of the production of tradable goods.
Under this interpretation, we can think of a depreciated real exchange rate as a rise in the
value of the tradable good production — that is, as an increase in R.
The following proposition shows that a rise in R can generate crises, when none existed
25before.
Proposition 6. Deﬁne L∗
0 as in (5) to be the equilibrium contract when the aggregate liqui-





Proof. Direct diﬀerentiation of (5) proves the result. QED.
Thus a rise in the outside option R can increase L∗
0(R,p,G,RFOR,B E,δ) above ξ/2.
Proposition 3 implies that such a change can lead all equilibrium contracts to be crisis con-
tracts. We conclude that real exchange rate depreciations can generate sovereign and domestic
debt crises.
6. Discussion
In this section, we discuss how we can enrich our model of sovereign default, whether
the global games approach is useful in eliminating the multiplicity of equilibria in the reporting
game, and how our results relate to those in the literature on international ﬁnancial crises.
A. Enriching Our Model of Sovereign Default
In our model, the government must repay all loans. In reality, governments have a
choice over whether to do so or not, and indeed much of the literature on sovereign default
focuses on this choice. In this subsection, we consider two diﬀerent ways to add such a choice
into the model. We argue that enriching the model in this way does not aﬀect our results
greatly.
Ex-Post Participation Constraint
In our model, the sovereign has no ability to deviate from the recommendations of
the contract. Suppose instead that in period 2, the sovereign has the option to pay the
contractually mandated τs or choose to face a sanction with exogenously speciﬁed cost k.
This option will impose an additional constraint on the equilibrium contracting problem
that τs ≤ k for all s. Intuitively, this additional constraint will increase the amount of risk
each entrepreneur must bear in states when his announced return is RH.T o s a t i s f y t h e
26incentive compatibility constraint of entrepreneurs, the contractually speciﬁed amount of
liquidation must increase. Thus, the ability of the sovereign to default increases the range of
the parameters consistent with equilibrium crisis contracts (just as increasing R or G does).
There is one empirical problem that emerges with this way of incorporating voluntari-
ness on the part of the sovereign. If the participation constraint binds, so that τ2 = k, then
τ2 cannot vary with ε as in the prior section. Note that this empirically unattractive feature
arises because in this model of default, the sovereign is tempted to endure the sanction in
good times, not bad times.
Private Information About the Aggregate State
In the above simple model of sovereign default, the sanction k never occurs in equilib-
rium. Hence, in equilibrium, default is really still only a label that distinguishes repayment
states from one another. Consider the following distinct model of default. Suppose that as
above, it is possible to impose a sanction of cost k on the sovereign. In contrast to the above
model, though, we assume that the sovereign has full commitment and that τs is privately
known to the sovereign.
The private information restriction will lead to an incentive-compatibility constraint
on the sovereign. In this model, in an equilibrium contract, the sovereign will pay k (with
some probability) for announcing values of s which lead to low repayments to the foreign
lender. As is true of the private debt contract in our benchmark model, we can interpret the
sovereign’s announcing a low value of s as being akin to declaring default.
This extra incentive constraint on the problem introduces even more risk to the entre-
preneurs, and so increases the amount of liquidation required. Again, this private-information
model of default expands the set of parameters consistent with equilibrium crisis contracts,
relative to our benchmark model. One attractive feature of this model is that, unlike the
prior participation-constraint model, the face value τ2 is an increasing function of ε (the
probability of a coordinated default crisis).
B. Global Games: Getting Rid of the Multiplicity?
The problem in this economy is that there are two possible Bayesian-Nash equilibria in
the reporting game. In one equilibrium, both entrepreneurs tell the truth. In the other, they
27coordinate on lying by claiming to be unsuccessful even when they are successful. In the past
ﬁfteen years, international economists have made eﬀective use of global games reﬁnements to
eliminate multiplicities that emerge models of currency crises (Morris and Shin (1998)). Can
these methods be used to the same eﬀect in our setting?
The essence of the global games approach is that we pick the equilibrium which best
approximates equilibrium play in a perturbed game which has small private signals about the
payoﬀs. In that way, we can understand which equilibrium is more robust to deviations from
common knowledge about those payoﬀs. But in our contracting setup, the lender writes down
a contract that speciﬁes FH,L 0H, and L00. Why would these numbers then be anything less
than common knowledge among the two entrepreneurs? To us, the lack of common knowledge
of payoﬀs that underlies the global games approach seems strained in our setting.16
C. Relationship to the International Financial Crises Literature
In the introduction, we discussed the relationship between our paper and the existing
theories of sovereign defaults. Our paper is also related to the broader literature that discusses
how ﬁnancial frictions can generate and exacerbate international ﬁnancial crises. The papers
in this literature have modelled a wide variety of ﬁnancial frictions. Several papers emphasize
that, especially in bad times, domestic banks/borrowers may run short on collateral that
is acceptable to foreign lenders (Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001); Chang and Velasco
(2001)17). Without this collateral, domestic agents face what is often termed a sudden stop
to their borrowing from abroad. Other papers stress the role of what are termed balance
sheet eﬀects. These models assume that exchange rate movements are unhedged. Then,
16It may still seem plausible to some readers that the two entrepreneurs’ strategies are not common knowl-
edge (as is assumed in a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium). What happens if we relax the common knowledge
assumption in an ad hoc fashion? Note that of the two equilibria under consideration, the truth-telling equi-
librium is actually less robust. We only consider the lying equilibrium if it is in fact a strict equilibrium.
But the truth-telling equilibrium is necessarily not strict because the incentive constraint holds with equal-
ity. Clearly, without much loss in utility to the entrepreneurs, the lender could alter the contract slightly,
so that truth-telling is a strict equilibrium. Nonetheless, under these slightly altered contracts, the lying
equilibrium still risk-dominates the truth-telling equilibrium. As Carlsson and van Damme (1993) argue, the
risk-dominant equilibrium survives a wider class of deviations from common knowledge and is the one picked
out by a global games reﬁnement.
17Chang and Velasco (2001) also highlight the role of foreign creditors in generating ﬁnancial crises. In
their model, runs on domestic deposits may interact with foreign creditor panics, depending on the maturity
of the foreign debt and the liquidity of domestic banks. As we noted in footnote 6, bank runs play no role in
generating the internal debt crises in our data.
28sudden devaluations decrease the value of domestic assets, generating insuﬃcient funds and
bankruptcies (Schneider and Tornell (2004)). Finally, in most, if not all, of these papers,
crises could be eliminated or ameliorated by better government policy. In particular, many
authors have been sharply critical of policies that commit the domestic government to bail
out domestic banks or entrepreneurs.
Our paper diﬀers from this prior literature in two important respects. First, in these
earlier papers, the various crises emerge at least in part because the country is involved in
international ﬁnancial markets. In our paper, crises occur only because of the upper bound on
liquidation. Hence, changes in the perceived probability of coordinated defaults can generate
sharp spikes in domestic interest rates even if the country were not able to borrow and lend
from overseas. It is true — of course — that sovereign default can only occur in our model
because the country is able to borrow from abroad. But this possibility of sovereign default
is only beneﬁcial, because it allows the country to insure itself against domestic shocks.
Second, and related, the existing literature points to government’s bad policies in the
form of bailout guarantees as being a source of crises (Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo
(2004)). We construct a contractual arrangement that is Pareto optimal, given the upper
bound on liquidation. If its debt level is relatively small, government bailout guarantees
are part of an ex-ante optimal arrangement. Intuitively, private agents interact with foreign
lenders/insurers only through their government. Because the foreign lenders are risk-neutral,
they provide transfers of resources to the home country when the country is doing poorly.
These transfers ﬂow through the government to the private sector. They are, in fact, (partial)
bailouts. Analyzing debt crises within an optimal contracting structure allows us to pinpoint
precisely the source of crises. Within our framework, improving ﬁnancial and legal institutions
domestically to resolve large-scale defaults is the only way to reduce the probability of crises.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we use data from developing countries to argue that sovereign debt
and domestic debt default risk are tightly linked. We ﬁnd a strong correlation in ex-ante
measures of default risk as well as ex-post default events in international sovereign loans
and private domestic loans. We use both temporal and country-speciﬁc evidence to establish
29that the domestic defaults cause the sovereign defaults, not the other way around. We ﬁnd
that widespread domestic defaults are generated by non-fundamental shocks. The resulting
domestic default crises then place great ﬁscal pressure on governments, leading at times to
defaults on foreign loans. We develop a simple model of these phenomena. The model shows
that, given aggregate constraints on liquidation, these kinds of crises are an inevitable part
of an optimal response to informational problems in private-sector lending.
In our model, outcomes would be improved if it were possible to increase the exogenous
parameter ξ (the upper bound on aggregate liquidation). In reality, this parameter is certainly
endogenous, and is determined by complex politico-economic forces. Understanding these
forces, and how to control them through better institutional design, is an important avenue
for future research.
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33Appendix A
In this appendix we provide details on the data sources, series and default events dates
used in the Section 2.
Default Risk Data
Private default risk is calculated as follows. For Argentina, Ecuador, Indonesia,
Panama, Peru, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine, we use the spread between dollar average
domestic lending rate and the yield U.S. Treasury of 1 year maturity. For Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Philippines, Thailand, and Venezuela, we use
the spread between the average local currency domestic lending rate and the average local
currency domestic deposit rate.
Sovereign default risk is the EMBI+ spread for Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador,
Mexico, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Ukraine, and Venezuela. The
additional ﬁve countries do not have EMBI+ spreads. These are the series used for them.
Chile: Inﬂation Indexed 10-year Bond Yield relative to the Inﬂation Indexed deposit rate
denominated in Chilean Peso, Indonesia: Spread of 7.75% Notes of 08-01-2006 denominated
in U.S. Dollars relative to yield of a 1 year U.S. Treasury, Korea: 5-year Government Bond
denominated in Korean South Won relative to the average deposit rate, Malaysia: 10-year
Government Bond Yield denominated in Malaysia Dollar relative to the average deposit rate,
Thailand: 10-year Government Bond Yield denominated in Thailand Baht relative to the
average deposit rate.
All the data come from the Global Financial Statistics Database and the International
Financial Statistics at the IMF except for the series on dollar lending rates for Poland and
Russia that come from each country’s Central Bank.
Dates of Sovereign Defaults and Internal Debt Crises
The following table reports the dates of sovereign defaults and internal debt crises.
34Table 3: Crisis Dates
Sovereign Defaults Internal Debt Crises
Argentina 82-93, 89, 01-04 80-82, 89, 95, 01-04
Brazil 83-94 90, 94-99
Chile 83-90 81-83
Colombia 82-87
Ecuador 85-95, 99-00 80-83, 95-97, 98-02
Indonesia 98-00, 02 94, 97—02
Korea 97-02
Malaysia 85-88, 97-01
Mexico 82-90 81-91, 94-00
Nigeria 82-92, 86-88, 92, 02 92-97
Panama 83-96, 87-94 88-89
Peru 80, 84-97 83-90
Philippines 83-92 81-87, 98-02
Poland 81-94 90-95
Russia 91-97, 98-00 95, 98-99
Thailand 83-87, 97-02
Ukraine 98-00 97-98
Venezuela 83-88, 90, 95-97 81-86, 94-95
Appendix B
In this appendix, we provide a proof of Proposition 5.
We ﬁrst prove that there is a neighborhood of 0 such that there is a unique equilibrium
contract for all ε ≥ 0. We start with ε =0 . Suppose that the equilibrium contract was such
that the constraint on aggregate liquidation does not bind. Then, the equilibrium contract’s
payments would be given by:








But this contract exceeds the upper bound on aggregate liquidation (because 2L00 exceeds ξ),
and cannot be an equilibrium contract. It follows that there is a unique equilibrium contract
35(τ,F,L):
FHH = FH0 = b FH
F00 = F0H = LH0 = LHH =0
L0H = b L0H,L 00 = δ
−1ξ/2
τ2 =2 b FH − 2R
τ1 = b FH + δb L0H − 2R
τ0 = ξ − 2R
where (b FH, b L0H) i st h eu n i q u es o l u t i o nt o :
uE(BE + R









+ puE(BE (1 − ξ/2) + R
H)
(1 − p)b FH + δp(1 − p)b L0H + p
2ξ/2=R + R
FORG/2
Now suppose ε>0. By the Theorem of the Maximum, there is a unique equilibrium contract
for ε near 0, and that contract’s (F,L) satisﬁes:
uE(BE + R
H − FH) − (1 − p)uE(BE (1 − L0H)+R
H) − puE(BE (1 − ξ/2) + R
H)=0 (6)
[p
2(1 − ε)+ε]ξ/2+δp(1 − p)(1 − ε)L0H +( 1− p)(1 − ε)FH = R + R
FORG/2 (7)
For notational convenience, we’ve set FH = FHH = FH0 and suppressed the dependence of
the payments on ε. Using the implicit function theorem, we can show that FH is continuously























0H(0) + (1 − p)F
0
H(0) = R + R
FORG/2 − ξ/2
36Substituting the ﬁrst equation into the second, we get:
p
δu0









H(0) + (1 − p)F
0
H(0) = R + R
FORG/2 − ξ/2
which implies that F 0
H(0) > 0. Since FH is C1 for ε near 0, we can conclude that F0
H(ε) > 0
for ε in a neighborhood of zero.
Proof. >From Proposition 3, we know that:
τ2(ε)=2 FH(ε) − 2R
and so τ0
2(ε) > 0. QED
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